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Abstract

To determine the best litigation strategy for defense attorneys presented with suggestive
eyewitness evidence, I tested the influence of identifications obtained through in-court and out-ofcourt identification procedures on jurors’ decision-making. I recruited Mock jurors through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (N = 375) to watch a videotaped simulation of a robbery trial
in which I varied whether the eyewitness made an in-court or out-of-court identification and the
suggestiveness of the out-of-court identification procedure. Watching a trial with either an in-court
or out-of-court identification procedure increased jurors’ likelihood to convict. Mock jurors who
viewed a trial with an out-of-court identification procedure had higher odds of rendering a guilty
verdict than did jurors’ who viewed an in-court identification procedure. When either an in-court
or out-of-court identification procedure were present, jurors rated the prosecution’s case to be
stronger and estimated there was a higher probability that the defendant committed the crime.
Although jurors recognized differences in the suggestiveness of the identification procedures, the
procedures' suggestiveness did not affect jurors’ decision to convict. Considering both
identification procedures increased the prosecution’s case strength and conviction rates, but the
odds of a guilty verdict were less with in-court identification than with an out-of-court
identification, the best litigation strategy for defense attorneys who are presented with suggestive
eyewitness evidence is to suppress the out-of-court identification and allow an in-court
identification.
Keywords: Jurors, eyewitness, identification procedures, convictions, juror decision
making
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Litigation Strategies for Suggestive Identification Evidence
Imagine you are a defense attorney who just received a case in which the only evidence
against your client is an out-of-court identification (an eyewitness identification of the defendant
conducted pre-trial). After reviewing the identification evidence and conducting personal
research regarding out-of-court identification procedures and the factors that influence their
reliability (e.g., single-blind administration, instructions that fail to warn the culprit may not be
present), it is evident that the identification procedures used were highly suggestive. You would
like to file a motion to suppress the out-of-court identification, but, in your experience, the
motion to suppress such identification almost always results in the prosecution moving for the
court to allow an in-court identification procedure. Moreover, the judge assigned to this case has
a record for permitting in-court identification procedures. Although this judge, like many other,
may allow an in-court identifications, the circumstances in which they occur are highly
suggestive as well. Do you move to suppress the suggestive out-of-court identification and risk
that the judge will allow the witness to identify your client in-court, during the trial proceedings?
Criminal defense attorneys face this dilemma with some frequency but there is little
research to guide their decision making. Although there is a substantial body of research
examining how suggestive out-of-court identifications influence jurors' trial judgments, there is
little known about how jurors react to in-court identifications. Without this research, there is no
empirical evidence to guide attorneys’ litigation strategies. Is it best to suppress the suggestive
out-of-court identification procedure and allow only the in-court identification, or is it possible to
expose the initial identification's suggestiveness to lessen perceptions of the in-court
identification procedure's reliability?
Identification Admissibility
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To determine the best litigation strategy, one must first understand when identification
evidence is admissible at trial. Regarding an out-of-court identification, the Supreme Court has
held that even though the identification procedure may be unnecessarily suggestive, it is still
admissible at trial as long as the identification is reliable (Neil v. Biggers, 1972). If the courts
find the identification procedure to be unduly suggestive, the Courts then initiate a five-factor
assessment to determine whether the suggestiveness of the procedure influenced the reliability,
and thus admissibility, of the out-of-court identification (State v. Higgins, 1979; State v
Hornbuckle, 1989). The five-factors consist of the following: (i) the opportunity of the witness to
view the actor at the time of the crime; (ii) the degree of attention exercised; (iii) the accuracy of
a prior description; (iv) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness; and (v) the length
of time between the crime and the confrontation when identification occurs (Neil v. Biggers,
1972; Manson v. Brathwaite, 1977). If the out-of-court identification is found unreliable, the
courts will rule the identification evidence as inadmissible.
Although the Supreme Court has ruled on the admissibility of out-of-court identifications,
state and federal circuit courts are still debating the admissibility of in-court identification
procedures (Kann, 2018). To date, there are only two states Massachusetts and Connecticut
that have recognized the inherent suggestiveness of in-court identification procedures and require
additional protections (Kann, 2018). In Massachusetts, if the witness made something less than
an unequivocal positive identification pre-trial (Commonwealth v. Collins, 2014), or if the State
failed to conduct a less suggestive out-of-court identification procedure, the courts can only
admit an in-court identification procedure if the prosecution can show “good reason”
(Commonwealth v. Crayton, 2014). Following Massachusetts, Connecticut has also held that the
trial courts must prescreen for both first-time in-court identifications and in-court identification
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procedures that may be tainted by a suggestive pre-trial identification (Commonwealth v.
Choeurn, 2006; State v. Dickson, 2016). Other state courts have held that in-court identification
procedures are admissible at trial, and the five-factor assessment need not apply because crossexamination of the eyewitness and the attorneys’ arguments are remedy enough against any
alleged suggestiveness (Byrd v. State, 2011; State v. Hickman, 2014; State v. Lewis, 2005).
Although some courts allow an in-court identification procedure in lieu of unreliable out-of-court
identification, there is no empirical evidence on how jurors might react to the in-court
identification procedure. In addition, in-court identification procedures are highly suggestive,
perhaps even more so than many suggestive out-of-court identifications.
The Suggestiveness of In-Court Identifications
In-court identification procedures violate at least four of the nine recommendations
provided by the scientific review paper for best practices for collecting eyewitness identifications
(Wells et al., 2020). For example, eyewitness scholars agree that an identification procedure
must be double-blind (neither the administrator nor the identifier knows who the suspect is) to
ensure that the administrator cannot communicate the suspect’s identity to the witness through
verbal or non-verbal cues (Wells et al., 2020). In an out-of-court identification procedure, cues
from a non-blind administrator can influence who the witness selects as the culprit (Greathouse
& Kovera, 2009; Zimmerman et al., 2017). During a trial, the eyewitness likely interprets the
defendant’s mere presence as an indication of whom the State believes committed the crime.
Therefore, the recommended best practice of a double-blind procedure is impossible in the
context of an in-court identification as the government has explicitly indicated to the witness who
it believes to be the culprit.
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An in-court identification procedure also prevents the recommended best practice of preprocedure instructions that clearly state to the witness that the culprit may or may not be present
(Wells et al., 2020). The recommendation for pre-procedure instructions is rooted in research
suggesting that witnesses who participate in an identification procedure frequently assume that
the culprit is present and that they must identify him or her (Clark, 2005; Memon et al., 2004;
Steblay, 1997; Wells, 1993). For this reason, scholars have strongly advised law enforcement
agencies to use pre-procedure instructions before every identification procedure (Wells et al.,
2020). However, as recognized in the United States v. Green (2013), during an in-court
identification procedure, the witness feels a sense of duty to help solve the crime and is “eager to
be of assistance.” Due to this sense of responsibility, no array of pre-procedure instructions could
mitigate the obligation a witness feels to identify the only suspect presented to them as the
culprit.
The third best practice an in-court identification procedure often violates is avoiding
repeated identification procedures involving the same eyewitness and same suspect (Wells et al.,
2020). Eyewitness scholars recommend avoiding repeat identification procedures because initial
identification procedures that included a given suspect could possibly contaminate the
eyewitness’ memory in any following identification procedures, including the same suspect
(Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006; Steblay & Dysart, 2016; Wells et al., 2020). In-court
identification procedures typically are repeated identifications as the witness asked to participate
in an in-court identification procedure has already participated in a previous identification
procedure that involved the defendant being tried. As a result, in-court identification procedures
do not conform with the recommended best practices.

LITIGATION STRATEGIES

8

Last, and arguably, the most fundamental best practice an in-court identification
procedure evades is avoiding single-suspect (show-up) identification procedures. Eyewitness
scholars have strongly recommended avoiding show-up procedures as studies have concluded
these procedures result in higher rates of mistaken identifications (Eisen et al., 2017; Wells et al.,
2020). Closer examination of show-up procedures found false identification rates of innocent
suspects were substantially higher when people felt as if they are part of an actual police
investigation than people who conducted the identification in a lab condition (Eisen et al., 2017).
Show-up procedures share many important qualities with in-court identification procedures.
During an in-court identification procedure, similar to a show-up procedure, the eyewitness is in
a high-pressure situation in which an authority figure asks them to identify the only handcuffed
suspect present. Thus, an in-court identification procedure presents with the same inherently
suggestive variables as a single-suspect show-up procedure. How does viewing such a suggestive
procedure influence jurors? As Supreme Court Justice Brennan said, “that there is almost nothing
more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points the finger at the defendant,
and says ‘That’s the one!’” (Watkins v. Sowders, 1981).
In-Court Identification Effects on Jurors
Despite being inherently suggestive, there is virtually no research examining how jurors
react to in-court identification procedures. Some research evaluating jurors’ reactions to out-ofcourt identifications suggests jurors who view certain suggestive identification procedures, such
as single-blind procedures, can identify the biases of the procedures and use the information to
draw inferences about the accuracy of the identification (Devenport et al., 2002; Modjadidi &
Kovera, 2018). Although the same suggestive variables are present during in-court identification
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procedures, this research did not evaluate jurors who view a live identification. The vividness of
the identification procedure could render different reactions from jurors.
Scholars have defined vividness as information that is “(a) emotionally interesting, (b)
concrete and imagery provoking, and (c) proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way”
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980, p. 45). Although the term vividness is often operationalized in the
psycho-legal context as the level of detail in a witness’ testimony (Bell & Loftus, 1985), the
broader definition posits an in-court identification procedure is more vivid to a juror than an outof-court identification. Consequently, an in-court identification procedure may have a more
substantial influence on a juror’s judgments, particularly as it affects a juror’s view of the
eyewitness’s credibility (Bell & Loftus, 1985). The notion that a juror could view the witness as
more credible, simply because the identification was made in the courtroom, is worrisome
considering the identification in question is suggestive and unreliable. However, if an attorney
were to sensitize jurors to the initial identification's suggestiveness, would this diminish the incourt identification procedure's vividness? Unfortunately, psychological research has yet to
examine how jurors interrupt and react to the in-court identification procedure.
Jurors’ Reactions and Sensitization to Suggestive Identification Procedures
Scholars have studied laypersons’ knowledge regarding eyewitness identification issues,
jurors’ sensitivity to suggestive variables, and jurors’ reactions to out-of-court identification
procedures (Benton et al., 2006; Cutler et al., 1989; Cutler et al., 1990; Desmarais & Read, 2011;
Devenport et al., 2002; Modjadidi & Kovera, 2018). These studies generally use two different
types of methodologies: the questionnaire method, in which laypersons are surveyed about
eyewitness identification variables to assess their knowledge about the variables that influence
eyewitness testimonies (Benton et al., 2006; Desmarais & Read, 2011), or the mock-jury method,
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in which studies ask participates to try a case involving an eyewitness identification (Cutler et
al., 1989; Cutler et al., 1990; Devenport et al., 2002; Modjadidi & Kovera, 2018). These studies
help to identify which variables have the potential to influence jurors’ decisions during a trial.
Multiple studies have used the “mock-jury” method to examine if jurors are sensitive to
the suggestiveness of biased procedure instructions and if that sensitivity influences jurors’
decision to convict (Cutler et al., 1989; Cutler et al., 1990; Devenport et al., 2002). When jurors
were shown biased procedure instructions (instructions that did not mention the suspect may not
be present), jurors rated the procedure as less fair than jurors who viewed unbiased procedure
instructions (instructions that did mention the suspect may not be present) (Cutler et al., 1989;
Cutler et al., 1990; Devenport et al., 2002). However, all three studies noted that the sensitivity to
the procedure instructions' suggestiveness did not influence the jurors’ decision to convict
(Cutler et al., 1989; Cutler et al., 1990; Devenport et al., 2002). Though one could argue courts
show witnesses with biased procedure instructions during an in-court identification procedure
(the witness is instructed to identify the suspect but is not instructed that the suspect may not be
present in the courtroom), research has not observed if the sensitivity to biased procedure
instructions translates to jurors who are viewing an in-court identification procedure.
Scholars have also studied the influence procedural administration has on jurors.
Modjadidi & Kovera (2018) used the mock-jury method to examine whether showing jurors a
videotape of a suggestive administration of an identification procedure would influence jurors’
conviction decision. The researchers varied whether participants watched a video of a nonsuggestive (double-blind) or a suggestive (single-blind) administration of an out-of-court
identification procedure. Modjadidi & Kovera (2018) reported jurors were sensitive to the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure administration. In fact, jurors could deduce the
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procedure was suggestive just from hearing the administrator knew who the suspect was.
However, there was no direct effect of administration type on jurors’ verdicts (Modjadidi &
Kovera, 2018). During an in-court identification procedure, jurors are viewing the administration
of the identification live. Would jurors’ verdicts be more sensitive to the in-court identification's
suggestiveness than they were to the suggestiveness of out-of-court administration procedures?
Little is known about how jurors evaluate the reliability of repeated identifications.
Research evaluating persuasive arguments has found people who implement a systematic view of
an argument are greatly influenced by repeated arguments. A systematic view of an argument is
when recipients of the argument “attempt to comprehend and evaluate the message’s arguments
as well as assess their validity in relation to the message’s conclusion” (Chaiken, 1980, p. 752).
When recipients of an argument feel that their judgments have important consequences on
themselves of others, they are more persuaded when an argument’s message is repeated multiple
times (Chaiken, 1980). Considering that jurors’ judgments have important consequences for the
defendant, jurors exposed to multiple identifications would likely be persuaded of the
identification's reliability. Yet, it is also possible that this double exposure would not translate to
verdicts; research has shown that jurors who witness multiple positive out-of-court
identifications might find the evidence to be more reliable, but this does not always lead to an
increase in guilty verdicts (Pozzulo & O’Neill, 2012). However, research has yet to examine how
viewing an in-court identification along with an out-of-court identification may influence jurors’
verdict decisions.
Another identification procedure variable to which jurors were not only sensitive but also
influenced jurors’ decision to convict was biased lineup procedures (Devenport et al., 2002).
During a mock-jury study, when jurors witnessed a biased lineup (fillers matched the suspect in
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no more than two dimensions), they rated the procedure as less fair than jurors who witnessed an
unbiased lineup (lineup members were selected if they matched on the five characteristics
mentioned by the witness) (Devenport et al., 2002). The sensitivity to the lineup biased carried
over into the jurors’ decision to convict; jurors who viewed the unbiased lineup procedures were
more likely to find the defendant guilty than jurors who viewed the biased lineup procedure
(Devenport et al., 2002). The jurors who viewed the biased lineup procedure assumed the
presence of other biases (Devenport et al., 2002). If jurors were to view an in-court identification
procedure after viewing a biased lineup, would their assumption of biases carry over to the incourt identification procedure? Additional research is necessary to answer this question.
Current Study
Although there is extensive research evaluating jurors’ perceptions of out-of-court
identifications, no known research measures how jurors’ reactions to in-court identification
procedures. Thus, the current study explores the influence of both out-of-court and in-court
identification procedures on jurors’ decision-making; specifically, the current study tests whether
it is a better litigation strategy for defense attorneys to move to suppress a suggestive out-ofcourt identification even if the success of that motion increases the likelihood that the court will
allow an in-court identification. Two variables were manipulated: (a) the presence of an in-court
identification and (b) whether the initial (out-of-court) identification was suppressed or obtained
via suggestive or not suggestive procedures. For this study's purposes, a suggestive identification
refers to a procedure in which the suspect's identification was compromised due to an unfair lineup procedure. Because previous research indicated jurors are sensitized to biased lineups and use
the information to determine procedure reliability (Devenport et al., 2002), I varied the
suggestiveness of the lineup composition of the out-of-court procedure, where the suggestive
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lineup contained fillers that caused the suspect to stand out among the lineup members in
contrast to a nonsuggestive lineup in which the suspect did not stand out from the other fillers. I
examined if the manipulated variables affected jurors’ verdicts, ratings of the eyewitness, and
ratings of the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. I predicted:
H1: Participants who viewed the mock trial in which the in-court identification procedure
was present would be more likely to choose a guilty verdict and would rate the
eyewitness more favorably than would participants who did not.
H2: Participants who viewed the mock trial in which the out-of-court identification
procedure was non-suggestive would be more likely to vote guilty and would rate the
eyewitness more favorably than would participants who viewed a mock trial in which
the out-of-court identification procedure that was suggestive or was suppressed at trial.
H3: Participants who viewed the out-of-court identification obtained via suggestive
procedures would rate the procedures as more suggestive than would participants who
viewed the trial in which the out-of-court identification was obtained via nonsuggestive
procedures.
H4: The effect of the out-of-court identification will moderate the effect of the in-court
identification on verdict and perceptions of the eyewitness. When participants do not
hear evidence about an out-of-court identification procedure or hear evidence about a
non-suggestive out-of-court procedure, participants who see the in-court identification
will be more likely to convict and rate the eyewitness less favorably than when they do
not see an in-court identification. Participants who did hear evidence about the
suggestive out-of-court procedure identification will be equally likely to convict and
rate the eyewitness equally favorably whether they see an in-court identification or not.
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Method

Participants
Participants (N=375) were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an
online crowdsourcing platform through which “requesters” post tasks that “workers” complete
for payment. MTurk posted the advertisement for the study (Appendix A), informing workers
they would be rewarded $5.00 if they chose to participate in and completed the study. An a
priori power analysis indicated that a sample of 375 participants was sufficient to detect a smallmedium effect (f=.17) with power = .80 and p < .05. Data from 127 participants were excluded
because they failed manipulation checks. After filtering out the participants who failed the
manipulation checks, the study’s sample consisted of a total of 248 participants, 136 men
(54.8%), 111 women (44.8%), and one nonbinary person (n = .4%). Of the total sample, 77.4%
identified as White or Caucasian; 15.7% as Black or African American; 11.7% as Hispanic,
Latino, or Spanish; 6% as Asian or Asian American; 2% as American Indian or Alaska Native;
.8% as Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and .8% as Other (e.g., biracial, multiracial).
Research Design
The experiment had a 2 (In-Court Identification: present vs. absent) X 3 (Initial
Identification: suppressed/not present vs. present/suggestive vs. present/not suggestive) factorial
design. Qualtrics randomly assigned participants to one of six conditions.
Materials
Participants viewed a video-recorded mock-trial simulation. The mock trial was scripted
and recorded. Three different actresses were recorded playing the eyewitness role for stimulus
sampling purposes (Wells, G. L., & Windschitl, P. D., 1999). Because there was no expectation
that findings would differ across actresses, data were collapsed across this variable.
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The mock trial involved an armed robbery, in which the defendant was identified by the
defendant’s Facebook photo matching the eyewitness’s description of the robbery and a partial
fingerprint found at the crime scene. Each condition included opening jury instructions, opening
statements from both the prosecution and defense, testimony from the eyewitness, the arresting
police officer, a fingerprint expert witness, closing arguments, and closing jury instructions.
Conditions with an initial identification present (suggestive and not suggestive) included
testimony from the officer who administrated the eyewitness photo lineup and a video of the
photo lineup presented to the eyewitness.
In-Court Identification Manipulation. In the in-court identification present conditions, the
eyewitness pointed to the defendant in the courtroom while giving her testimony, saying, “…
he’s right in front of all of our very eyes! He’s sitting at the defense table.” In the conditions in
which the in-court identification was not present, the eyewitness was never asked if she saw the
defendant, nor does the witness ever point to the defendant during her testimony.
Initial Identification Manipulation. All conditions in which an initial identification procedure
was presented into evidence contained testimony from the arresting officer in which the officer
addressed how he selected the photo lineup, a testimony from the lineup administrator, and a clip
of the photo lineup itself. The testimony of the administrator did not vary in any of the conditions
with the out-of-court identification.
In the conditions with a suggestive out-of-court identification, the arresting officer stated
that he selected the defendant’s photo from the defendant’s Facebook page and the adult offender
database's filler photos. In this condition, the lineup presented included five filler photos of men
who matched the eyewitness description in white shirts standing against a white background and
a defendant's photo in a green shirt standing against a colored background. In the conditions with
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an initial identification that is not suggestive, the arresting officer explains that he took a picture
of the defendant against a white background to match the filler photos. In this condition, the
lineup presented included all men who match the eyewitness’s description in white shirts
standing against a white background.
Post-trial questionnaire. All participants completed a self-reported 24-item post-trial
questionnaire (Appendix C) designed for this study, with some items adapted from previous
research (Levett & Kovera, 2009; Modjadidi & Kovera, 2018).
Verdict, probability of guilt ratings. In the first portion of the questionnaire, participants chose a
verdict of guilty or not guilty. Participants then rated how confident in their verdict they were
and the probability the defendant committed the crime on a scale from 0%–100%.
Strength of Prosecution’s Case. Using a 7-point Likert scale with 1 indicating strongly disagree
and 7 indicating strongly agree, participants rated their agreement with four statements regarding
the strength of the attorneys’ cases: (a) The prosecution’s case was strong, (b) The prosecution
did not have a lot of evidence of the defendant’s guilt (R), (c) The defense’s case was strong (R),
and (d) The defense’s case failed to raise reasonable doubt. Items followed by an (R) were
reverse coded. I conducted an exploratory factor analysis with PAF and varimax rotation on the
four case strength ratings. All items loaded on a single factor with factor loadings greater than .4.
I created a scale, case strength, by averaging the four items, which demonstrated good reliability
(Cronbach's  = .88). Higher numbers indicated a more positive rating of the strength of the
prosecution's case.
Ratings of the eyewitness. Using a 7-point Likert scale with 1 indicating not at all to 7 indicating
extremely, participants rate ten eyewitness characteristics: credible, honest, nervous (R),
confident, suggestible (R), intelligent, certain, unsure (R), believable, and hesitant (R). Items
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followed by an (R) were reverse coded. I conducted an exploratory factor analysis of
participants' ratings of the eyewitness using principal axis factoring (PAF) and varimax rotation
to assist with data reduction. All items loaded on a single factor with factor loadings greater than
.4. I averaged responses to these items to create a credibility scale ( = .83), with higher numbers
indicating a more positive rating of the eyewitness.
Identification Fairness. Depending on which condition participants were shown, participants
were asked to use a 7-point Likert scale with 1 indicating strongly disagree and 7 indicating
strongly agree to rate the identification procedure shown to them. Higher levels indicated a more
positive rating; items followed by an (R) were reverse coded, items followed by an (IN) were
asked to participants shown an in-court identification procedure, and items followed by an (OC)
were asked to participants shown an out-of-court identification procedure. Responses to these
items were averaged to create an out-of-court identification procedure fairness scale ( = .84):
(a) The photo array was fair (OC), (b) The photo array was suggestive (R) (OC), (c) The fillers
caused the suspect to stand out from the other lineup members (R) (OC), (d) The suspect and
fillers were photographed in the same way (OC). Responses to these items were averaged to
create an in-court identification procedure fairness scale ( = .53): (a) The in-court identification
procedure was fair (IN), (b) The in-court identification procedure was suggestive (R) (IN).
Procedures
The Institutional Review Board at the City University of New York approved the
research protocol for this study. Although this study did not use deception, measures were taken
to protect human participants, such as obtaining informed consent from participants and
providing a debriefing statement at the end of the study.
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Participation in this study required a computer, internet access, and an MTurk account.
On MTurk, participants viewed an advertisement for the study (Appendix A). After participants
have chosen to participate, a link was available that directed them to an online survey software,
Qualtrics, where they completed the remainder of the study. Participants were then be prompted
to read a consent form (Appendix E) that contained the purpose, benefits, and risks of
participating in the study. If participants consented to the study, they were randomly assigned to
view one of the six mock-trial videos (see the scripts in Appendix B). After viewing the mocktrial video, participants were prompted to complete a post-trial questionnaire (Appendix C) that
included a demographics survey. Upon survey completion, participants then read a brief
debriefing statement (Appendix D). On average, the survey took approximately 55 minutes to
complete. At the end of the survey, Qualtrics provided participants with a random identification
number to receive compensation via MTurk.
Results
Data Analytic Strategy
My two main objectives were to examine how identification procedures affect
participants' decisions to convict and participants' evaluations of the eyewitness. These
objectives were achieved using binary logistic regression to examine any dichotomous decisions
(i.e., verdict, whether a photo array or an in-court identification was present) then using analysis
of variance (ANOVAs) to examine participants' ratings of the eyewitness.
Manipulation Check
The manipulation of the in-court identification was successful; a logistic regression
revealed a main effect for in-court identification (Wald χ2 (1, N = 368) = 121.79, p < .001, odds
ratio (OR) = 15.10, 95% confidence interval (CI) [8.66, 26.31]). The odds that the participants
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reported seeing the eyewitness point to the defendant during the trial were 15 times greater when
an in-court identification was present (72.8%) than when the in-court identification was absent
(27.2%).
The manipulation of the out-of-court identification was also successful in that a logistic
regression revealed a main effect for both non-suggestive (Wald χ 2 (2, N = 368) = 37.32, p <
.001, OR = 89.6, 95% CI [21.18, 378.9]) and suggestive (Wald χ2 (2, N = 368) = 59.79, p < .001,
OR = 20.44, CI = [9.51, 43.93]) of out-of-court identifications. Participants were more likely to
say they viewed a photo array when they viewed a non-suggestive photo array (40.4%) or a
suggestive photo array (41.5%) than participant who did not view a photo array at trial (18.1%).
All participants who failed the manipulation check were excluded from the data analysis, thus
leaving us with the final number of 248 participants.
Verdict
To test my hypotheses, I conducted a binary logistic regression representing both main
effects and their interaction (Table 1). I predicted that participants who watched a trial in which
the in-court identification was present would be more likely to convict than participants who
watched a trial with in-court identification absent (H1). Hypothesis 1 was supported by a main
effect of the presence of an in-court identification on verdict, (Wald χ 2(1, N = 248) = 5.16, OR =
1.90, p =.023, 95% CI [1.09, 3.29]. The odds that a participant convicted was almost 2 times
greater when the participant viewed an in-court identification (47.5%) than when the participants
did not see an in-court identification (30.8%).
I also predicted that participants who watched the trial in which the out-of-court
identification was non-suggestive would be more likely to convict than participants who watched
the trial in which the out-of-court identification was either suggestive or suppressed (H2). The
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hypothesis was partially supported. The odds that a participant convicted was almost 5 times
greater (OR = 4.92, p < .001, 95% CI [2.34, 10.32]) when the participant viewed a nonsuggestive out-of-court identification (51.8%) and a little over 4 times greater (OR = 4.17, p <
.001, 95% CI = 1.98, 8.16) when shown a suggestive out-of-court identification (48.4%) than
when the out-of-court identification was suppressed (17.6%). Contrary to Hypothesis 2, when
compared to the suggestive out-of-court identification manipulation, the odds that a participant
would convict when they viewed a non-suggestive out-of-court identification were not
significantly higher (Wald χ2(1, N = 248) = .207, Odds Ratio (OR) = 1.15, p =.649, 95% CI [.63,
2.08].
Finally, I predicted an interaction effect between out-of-court identifications and in-court
identification on jurors' verdicts (H4). Specifically, I predicted jurors who viewed a trial in which
the out-of-court identification that was either non-suggestive or suppressed would be more likely
to convict if they additionally viewed an in-court identification. However, jurors who viewed a
trial with a suggestive out-of-court identification would be equally likely to convict whether they
viewed an in-court indentation or not. There was no significant interaction between the in-court
identification and out-of-court identification type. Neither the interaction between in-court and
non-suggestive (Wald χ2(1, N = 248) = .03, Odds Ratio (OR) = .88, p =.872, 95% CI [.197,
3.97] nor the interaction between in-court and suggestive (Wald χ2(1, N = 248) = .03, Odds
Ratio (OR) = 1.15, p =.855, 95% CI [.25, 5.21] out-of-court identification manipulations were
statistically significant.
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Table 1
Effects of Manipulated Variables on Verdicts
______________________________________________________________________________
Variables in the Equation
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Variables in the Equation
In Court ID

B
.640

S.E.
.282

Out of Court ID
OCID Non-suggestive
OCID Suggestive
In Court * OCID Non-suggestive
In Court * OCID Suggestive

Wald
5.163

df
1

Sig.
.023

19.431

2

.000

Exp(B)
1.896

Lower
1.092

Upper
3.292

1.593

.378

17.747

1

.000

4.919

2.344

10.322

1.417

.375

14.253

1

.000

4.126

1.977

8.612

-.123

.766

.026

1

.872

.884

.197

3.967

.140

.771

.033

1

.855

1.151

.254

5.214

.138
.304
.207
1
.649
1.148
.633
2.081
OCID Non-suggestive* OCID Suggestive
Note: CI= confidence interval; Exp(B)= odds ratio; OCID = Out of Court Identification. Dummy codes were: not guilty = 0;
guilty = 1; in-court id present=1; non-suggestive out-of-court id= 1; suggestive out-of-court id = 2

Case Strength
I conducted a 2 (in-court identification) x 3 (out-of-court identification) analysis of
variance (ANOVA) on participants' evaluations of case strength. The presence of an in-court
identification had a significant effect on participants rating of case strength, F(1, 242) = 5.94, p
=.015, d = .36, 95% CI [.0.18, 0.98]. Participants rated the prosecution’s case as stronger when
the in-court identification was present (M = 3.84, SD = 1.55) than when it was absent (M = 3.26,
SD = 1.67). Out-of-court identification procedures also had a significant effect on participants’
evaluations of case strength, F(1, 242) = 11.81, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s
HSD indicated participants who viewed no out-of-court identification (M = 2.85, SD = 1.43)
found the prosecution’s case to be weaker than did participants who viewed a non-suggestive (M
= 4.09, SD = 1.67, d = .80, 95% CI [-1. 82, -65]), t(242) = -5.01, p < .001, and suggestive (M =
3.73, SD = 1.56, d = .59, 95% CI [.1.45, -.30]), t(242) = -3.60, p = .001, out-of-court
identification.
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I also observed the correlation between case strength and participants’ rating on the
probability of commission. Case strength and participants’ rating on the probability of
commission were found to be strongly correlated r(246) = .81, p < .001.
Table 2.
Mean Comparison of Case Strength Ratings

Out-of-Court Identification
In-Court

Suppressed
M

SD

Not-Suggestive
n

M

SD

n

Suggestive
M

Total

SD

n

M

SD

n

Present

3.11 1.32

36 4.34 1.41

49

3.86 1.54

56

3.84 1.55 141

Absent

2.61 1.52

38 3.74 1.93

36

3.51 1.59

33

3.26 1.69 107

Total

2.85 1.43

74 4.09 1.67

85

3.73 1.56

89

3.59 1.63 248

Eyewitness Credibility
I hypothesized main and interaction effects of the identifications on the participants'
ratings of the eyewitness's credibility. There was no significant main effect of the in-court
identification procedure, F(1, 242) = .46, p =.499) nor the out-of-court identification procedure
on participants ratings of eyewitness credibility, F(1, 242) = 1.75, p =.177). There was also no
interaction of the in-court and out-of-court identification procedures on participants' ratings of
eyewitness favorability, F(2, 242) = 1.03, p =.359).
Table 3.
Mean Comparison of Eyewitness Credibility Ratings
In-Court
Present
Absent
Total

Out-of-Court Identification
Suppressed
Not-Suggestive
Suggestive
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
4.72 0.91 36 5.10 0.87 49 5.04 1.03 56
4.78 0.97 38 4.98 1.18 36 4.73 0.90 33
4.75 0.94 74 5.05 1.01 85 4.84 0.99 89

Total
M
SD
4.85 0.98
4.94 1.00
4.90 0.98

n
141
107
248
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Identification Suggestiveness
Although I had hypothesized jurors would be able to note the suggestiveness of the
suggestive out-of-court identification procedure, I also analyzed both identification procedures'
effects on participants' ratings of both identification procedures' suggestiveness using two
separate ANOVAs. First, I examined the effects of the out-of-court identifications on
participants' suggestiveness ratings of the in-court identifications. The presence of an out-ofcourt identification procedure had a significant effect on jurors' suggestiveness ratings of the incourt identification procedure, F(2, 137) = 6.46, p =.02. Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s
HSD exposed a significant mean difference between the participants who only viewed an incourt identification procedure (i.e., the out-of-court was suppressed; M = 3.68, SD = 1.34) and
participants who viewed an in-court identification with either a non-suggestive (M = 4.42, SD
=1.18, d = .59, 95% CI [-1.40, -.07]), t(137) = -2.61, p <.001, or suggestive (M = 4.33, SD =1.32,
d = .49, 95% CI [-1.30, -.003]), t(137) = -2.38, p < .001, out-of-court identification. Participants
found the in-court identification procedure to be less suggestive when presented with either type
of out-of-court identification procedure than when presented on its own.
Table 4.
Mean Comparison of In-Court Identification Suggestiveness

In-Court
Present
Total

Out-of-Court Identification
Suppressed
Not-Suggestive
Suggestive
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
3.68 1.34 36 4.42 1.82 48 4.33 1.31 56
3.68 1.34 36 4.42 1.82 48 4.33 1.31 56

Total
M
SD
4.19 1.30
4.19 1.30

n
104
104

In addition, there was a significant interaction observed between in-court identification
procedures and initial identification procedures on participants' ratings of the suggestive out-ofcourt identification procedure’s suggestiveness, F(1,169) = 4.70, p =.032. A simple effects test

LITIGATION STRATEGIES

24

revealed a significant mean difference between the present (M = 3.52, SD = 1.39), and absent (M
= 2.70, SD = 1.54) in-court identification conditions t(169) = -2.70, p < .008, within the
suggestive out-of-court identification group. However, there was no significant mean difference
between the presence (M = 5.21, SD = 1.37) and absence (M = 5.32, SD = 1.22) of an in-court
identification within the non-suggestive out-of-court identification group t(169) = -3.70, p =.71.
The presence of an in-court identification caused participants to find the suggestive out-of-court
identification to be less suggestive than when the suggestive out-of-court identification was
presented without the accompanying in-court identification.
Table 5.
Mean Comparison of Out-of-Court Identification Suggestiveness
Out-of-Court Identification
In-Court

Not-Suggestive

Suggestive

Total

M

SD

n

M

SD

n

M

SD

n

Present

5.21

1.37

48

3.52

1.39

56

4.30

1.62

104

Absent

5.33

1.22

36

2.70

1.54

33

4.07

1.91

69

Total

5.26

1.30

84

3.21

1.50

89

4.21

1.74

173

There was a significant mean difference between participants’ ratings of the
suggestiveness of the non-suggestive (M = 5.26, SD = 1.30) and suggestive (M = 3.21, SD =
1.50) out-of-court identifications, F(1,169) = 100.891, p < .001). Thus, participants noted the
difference in the suggestiveness of the two administration procedures, confirming H3 and the
success of the manipulation of the suggestiveness of the out-of-court identification.
I also observed the correlation between participants' ratings of identification procedures'
suggestiveness and participants’ rating on the probability of commission. There was a moderate
correlation between participants' suggestiveness ratings of out-of-court identification procedures
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and participants’ rating on the probability of commission r(171) = .40, p < .001 and a weak
correlation between participants' suggestiveness ratings of in-court identification procedures and
participants’ rating on the probability of commission r(139) = .38, p < .001.
Discussion
Scholars warn against the use of suggestive identification procedures when collecting
eyewitness identification evidence (Wells et al., 2020). Although out-of-court identifications can
vary in their degree of suggestiveness, in-court identifications are inherently suggestive. To date,
however, it is unclear which identification procedure, in-court or out-of-court, has the more
significant influence over jurors' decision to convict. Determining which identification procedure
has the more significant influence over jurors' decision to convict can help defense attorneys
determine which identification procedure is best to avoid during a trial. The expectation is if
defense attorneys are better able to avoid the more influential suggestive identification procedure
during their trials, they can hopefully lessen the rates of wrongful convictions due to
misidentifications. The current study examined the effects of both in-court and out-of-court
identification procedures on jurors' decisions to convict. In addition, this study observed how
identification procedures affected jurors' judgments of the eyewitnesses and the case evidence.
The goal was to establish the identification procedures' influence over jurors and determine the
best litigation strategy for defense attorneys when presented with suggestive eyewitness
identification evidence.
In-Court Identification Procedures
I had two hypotheses regarding the in-court identification procedure's influence on jurors'
decisions. I predicted that mock jurors who viewed an in-court identification would be more
likely to render a guilty verdict than would mock jurors who did not view an in-court
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identification. I also anticipated that the type of out-of-court identification would moderate the
effects of an in-court identification on verdict. In particular, I predicted that an in-court
identification would increase the likelihood of a guilty verdict in scenarios in which the mock
jurors also viewed a non-suggestive out-of-court identification or did not view an out-of-court
identification (i.e., it was suppressed). In contrast, I predicted that the in-court identifications
would not affect verdicts when the out-of-court identification was obtained via suggestive
procedures because the suggestiveness of the out-of-court procedures would sensitize jurors to
the suggestiveness of the in-court identification.
As predicted, the presence of an in-court identification procedure increased the mock
jurors' likelihood to convict. The presence of an in-court identification procedure also increased
mock jurors' ratings of the strength of the prosecution's evidence and case, suggesting that mock
jurors found the prosecution's evidence more compelling when they saw an in-court
identification procedure during a trial. Thus, hearing evidence about both in-court and out-ofcourt identification procedures independently increased mock jurors' likelihood to convict. This
finding was similar to research that looked at mock jurors' double exposure to out-of-court
identifications (Pozzulo & O'Neill, 2012) and is consistent with research regarding persuasive
arguments suggest people are more likely to be persuaded when they hear an argument multiple
times (i.e., an in-court and out-of-court identification procedure; Chaiken, 1980).
Contrary to our hypothesis, however, the type of out-of-court identification did not
moderate the effects of in-court identifications on mock jurors’ decision to convict. There was,
however, an interaction effect regarding mock jurors' ratings of the in-court identification
procedure's fairness. Mock jurors perceived the in-court identification procedure as less
suggestive when presented with an out-of-court identification procedure than when presented on
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their own. Considering the presence of an out-of-court identification convinced jurors that the incourt identification was less suggestive but did not increase the conviction rate would suggest
that the identification procedure's suggestiveness does not influence jurors' decision to convict.
This finding was further supported given that there was no correlation between the mock jurors’
ratings of the identifications’ suggestiveness and their belief that the defendant committed the
crime. This finding is consistent with past research, which revealed that even when jurors
identified an identification procedure as suggestive, it did not reduce their likelihood of
conviction (Cutler et al., 1989; Cutler et al., 1990).
Out-of-Court Identification Procedures
Consistent with my hypothesis, the presence of an out-of-court identification increased
the likelihood of a guilty verdict. Similar to the findings with in-court identifications, mock
jurors found the prosecution's evidence more compelling and possibly more influential on their
decision to convict when they viewed an out-of-court identification procedure during a trial.
However, contrary to my hypothesis, mock jurors who viewed an out-of-court identification
obtained using suggestive procedures were just as likely to convict as mock jurors who viewed
an out-of-court identification obtained with non-suggestive procedures. I had hypothesized that
mock jurors who viewed a suggestive out-of-court identification would be able to recognize the
identification as more suggestive and thus be more skeptical of the identification, thus lessening
its influence and the influence of the in-court identification on mock jurors' verdicts. Although
mock jurors were able to recognize differences in the suggestiveness of the procedures used to
obtain the out-of-court identification, this recognition did not moderate the effects of the
suggestive in-court identification on jurors’ verdicts. In fact, adding an in-court identification to
the trial only decreased the suggestiveness ratings for suggestive identification procedures,
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suggesting that the inherent suggestiveness of the in-court procedure served as a contrast for the
less suggestive, albeit suggestive, out-of-court procedure. However, even though mock jurors
recognized suggestive out-of-court identifications as more suggestive than non-suggestive outof-court identification, this did not deter mock jurors from rendering a guilty verdict.
Implications
This research study's goal was to examine the effect of both in-court and out-of-court
identification procedures and determine the best litigation strategy for defense attorneys when
presented with suggestive eyewitness evidence. Considering that both identification procedures
strengthened jurors' views of the prosecution’s case and evidence, and the stronger the
prosecution's case appeared to jurors, the more likely they were to render a guilty verdict, it
would be best for defense attorneys to avoid the presence of either identification procedure.
However, it is unlikely a judge will allow the suppression of both identification procedures. In
which case, considering out-of-court identification resulted in the highest odds of a guilty
verdict, this data suggest it may be better to allow an in-court identification procedure if the outof-court identification can be suppressed. Considering that presenting both suggestive
identification procedures did not make jurors more skeptical of the suggestiveness of the
identification but only increased how fair the procedures appeared, it would be best to only
present one identification at trial. Thus, the best litigation strategy when presented with a
suggestive out-of-court identification would be to suppress the out-of-court identification
procedure and permit an in-court identification procedure.
Limitations
Though these findings are important, my study did have several limitations. First and
foremost, I recognize my study had low statistical power because of data collection limitations
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due to the COVID-19 pandemic. I believe this limitation causes a type two error and may be why
certain hypotheses were not significant. Future researchers should replicate the study but with
more statistical power to determine if the hypotheses truly are supported.
Second, the trial was video recorded simulation of a trial and not an actual trial. This
limitation may have decreased the in-court identification procedures' vividness effect, limiting
the identification's true influence. In addition, because participants know the trial is solely a
mock trial and prerecorded, participants may feel their convictions have less of an implication on
a person's life and thus quicker to choose guilty than they would be during a real live trial.
However, the need to control external variables and the inability to expose participants to a live
trial made a videotaped trial unavoidable.
Last, MTurk was used to gather data for this study which presents specific limitations of
its own. First, because MTurk has a small population of workers asked to participate in
numerous studies each month, it is possible the MTurk participant of this study may have been
exposed to similar experiments and research labs. Second, some research suggests MTurk
workers' populations differ from the general population (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013).
Considering the use of MTurk requires a web-based platform and some basic knowledge of
technology, the MTurk population may exclude more elder adults and those within lower
socioeconomic statuses, whereas jury selection would not. To improve generalizability, future
research should consider exploring ways to match the general population better.
Future Research
Considering this research found that even though the jurors recognized an identification
as unfair, these identification procedures still strengthen the prosecution's case and evidence, it is
possible jurors are unaware it is the identification procedure influencing their opinions of the
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case. Future research should consider repeating the study but bringing in an expert witness to
educate jurors on the suggestiveness of the identification and assess the effect of expert
testimony safeguard on jurors decision-making.
Conclusion
The Innocence Project noted 70 percent of their exonerated cases were originally
convicted due to suggestive misidentifications (Innocence Project, 2019). To decrease the rate of
wrongfully convicted defendants due to suggestive misidentifications, it is important to know
how suggestive identifications influence jurors' decision to convict and the relative influence of
in-court and out-of-court identifications.
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Appendix A: MTurk Recruitment Posting
Title: Legal Decision Making
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Description: The Purpose of This Study Is to Understand How People Make Decisions About
Criminal Trials. If You Choose to Participate, You Will View Videos of a Trial for a
Hypothetical Case. You Will Then Answer Several Questions About the Case and the Decisions
That Are Made. The Study Should Take Approximately Thirty Minutes to Complete. We Will
Review Completed Responses to Ensure That You Completed the Study and Provided Usable
Data Before Confirming Compensation. You Will Not Be Compensated If You Submitted Your
Responses in an Impossibly Short Amount of Time, Failed Attention Checks, or Provided
Nonsensical Responses. Only One Completed Assignment per IP Address Will Be compensated.
Keywords: Survey
Reward per Assignment: $5.00
Worker Requirements: Location Is in United States, 18 years or Older, US Citizen.

Appendix B: Mock-Trial Scripts
Key:
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SUGGESTIVE
NOT SUGGESTIVE
SUGGESTIVE AND NOT SUGGESTIVE
SUPPRESSED
IN COURT ID PRESENT
Judge’s Instructions
JUDGE: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we are about to commence a criminal case. The State
of New York has filed a complaint which alleges that on March 24th st, 2019, the defendant,
Samuel Williams, engaged in the crime of armed robbery of Heather Potter. The defendant,
Samuel Williams, has pled not guilty. The State of New York therefore has the burden of
proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State of New York, representing
Heather Potter, is represented in this case by Mr. Robbins. The defendant, Samuel Williams, is
represented in this case by Mr. Dodd.
Now ladies and gentlemen, there are some general instructions of law that apply to all
criminal cases. I want you to bear these principals in mind. The complaint, which I’ve just read
from, is itself not evidence. It creates no inference of guilt. Therefore, no member of the jury
should in anyway permit herself or himself to be prejudiced against the defendant just because a
complaint had been filed against him or because he was arrested or because he has been placed
on trial. Under the constitution, every defendant is presumed innocent of the charges made
against him. Before you can find him guilty, the state must prove his guilt. The defendant does
not have to prove his innocence. The presumption of innocence remains with the defendant
unless or until a jury decides that he has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by
evidence admitted at the trial. A reasonable doubt is a fair, honest doubt growing out of the
evidence or lack of evidence. It is not merely an imaginary or possible doubt, but a doubt based
on reason and common sense. A reasonable doubt is just that a doubt that is reasonable, after a
careful and considered examination of the facts and circumstances of this case.
In the course of the trial, you will hear evidence from a number of witnesses. You’re
going to have to make judgments about their credibility. You’re going to have to decide which
testimony you should believe. Listen carefully to the testimony of all the witnesses; keep it all in
your mind until you hear the whole case. As you listen to each witness, you should consider his
or her interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case. You should rely on your own
experience, judgment, and your own common sense in evaluating whether a particular witness is
the kind of a person that you would be inclined to believe in matters of the highest concern. It is
important for you to keep an open mind and not make a decision about anything in the case until
you retire to make your verdict in the case. You should not form any definite or fixed opinion on
the merits of the case until you have heard all the evidence, the argument of the lawyers, and the
instructions on the law by the judge. Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence, or lack
of evidence, and the law.
Prosecution Opening Statement
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MR. Robbins: Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, my name is Mr. Robbins, I am
representing the State of New York on behalf of Heather Potter. I am going to summarize for you
what the State of New York expects the evidence in this case to show. I want to make one thing
perfectly clear before I go any further. What I say and what the defense lawyer will say during
this trial, during the opening statements, and during the closing arguments is not evidence in this
case. The evidence is what you will hear from the witness stand from witnesses under oath.
You people, as a jury, are representatives of the people of the state of New York and of
New York County. In that capacity, your very important duty is to follow the law that the judge
will give you, to analyze the evidence, and to apply the law to that evidence and the facts of this
case. I would only ask you that you use your sound judgment and common sense in carrying out
that duty.
Today, you will hear evidence that will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sam
Williams robbed Ms. Potter at gunpoint while she was working her shift at the Embassy Suites
Hotel. You will also hear testimony from fingerprint examiner, Tom Bapty, who gathered
forensic evidence from the crime scene and hear the testimony of the arresting officer, Officer
Mark Reilly.
In addition, you will hear testimony from Officer Stephen O’Malley, who was brought in
to conduct the identification procedure. Along with the testimony, you will be presented with a
photograph of the six-man lineup that was presented to Ms. Potter, in which Ms. Potter selected
Mr. Williams as the perpetrator.
This is the basic evidence that I anticipate presenting on behalf of the State of New York.
I ask you to watch and listen to these witnesses who testify very closely for any motive or reason
that they may have to tell you anything less than the truth. Remember it is your job to draw
conclusions from this evidence. I am confident that the evidence will convince you beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Williams is guilty of the crime of which he is charged and at the end of
the trial I am going to stand up here and ask you to find him guilty of armed robbery. Thank you
very much.
Defense Opening Statement
Mr. Dodd: Mistaken identity. Let me say that again. Mistaken identity! Hello, ladies and
gentlemen, my name is Mr. Dodd and I represent Mr. Williams in this case. The purpose of a
trial is for both sides of a case to have an opportunity to present evidence. You have heard the
prosecutor give his opening statement on the evidence that he intends to present to you. Based on
that evidence, the prosecution is going to have a difficult time convincing anyone of Mr.
William’s guilt.
The prosecution’s case relies only on Heather Potter’s identification and a partial fingerprint.
The police did not find the gun used in the robbery nor did they find any proceeds of the robbery
in Mr. Williams’s possession. Thus, we will show that this is a case of mistaken identity.
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The prosecution’s case relies solely on a partial fingerprint. The police did not find the gun used
in the robbery nor did they find any proceeds of the robbery in Mr. Williams’s possession. Thus,
we will show how this has led to a case of mistaken identity.
We agree that this was a heinous crime, and someone should be punished, but that
someone is not Mr. Williams. Keep in mind that throughout this trial, the state bears the burden
of proof. They must prove beyond and to the exclusion of any reasonable doubt that Mr.
Williams committed this crime.
At the conclusion of this case, I will have another opportunity to address you. At that
time, I will be able to give you a final argument. It is in that final argument that I will ask you to
find my client, Samuel Williams, not guilty of armed robbery. Thank you very much.
Direct Examination of Heather Potter
JUDGE: Mr. Robbins, would you like to call your first witness?
PROSECUTOR: Yes, your honor, the State would like to call Heather Potter to the stand.
Q:

Please state your full name.

A:

My name is Heather Marie Potter.

Q:

Heather, where are employed?

A:

The Embassy Suites in New York City.

Q:

How long have you worked there?

A:

Five years.

Q:

Could you describe your responsibilities at the Embassy Suites?

A:
I am responsible for staffing the front desk, confirming reservations, and checking in
guests.
Q:

Ms. Potter, can you please describe the lobby of the Embassy Suites Hotel?

A:
It’s an old-fashioned kind of hotel. It has plate glass windows in the front. There are
shelves on both side walls, and couches on the floor. The front desk where we check people in is
right in the middle facing forward. The whole lobby is approximately 50 feet wide and 65 feet
deep.
Q.

Have you ever been robbed before?

A.

No.
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Q.
I’d like to now discuss the particular robbery in question. Do you recall what day of the
week it was and what time the incident took place?
A.

It was on a Friday, March 24th, at 9:00 P.M.

Q:

On Friday, March 24th, at 9:00 P.M., where were you?

A:

I was standing in the lobby behind the front desk.

Q:

Tell us what happened.

A:
Well, there was no one at the front desk or in the lobby except me. The door to the hotel
opened, and someone walked in. I was on the phone booking a reservation for a future guest, so
I didn’t look up—people tend to ask me questions if I make eye contact, so I wait until the phone
conversation is over. When I hung up the phone, the person was gone. I figured it was a guest
going to their room, so I didn’t think much about it.
Q:

So, you saw him enter into the lobby?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And you were looking at him?

A:

Well I just glanced at him. I knew it was a man, but I didn’t notice anything at that point.

Q:

Would you say during that time you got a good look at him?

A:

No, not at that time.

Q.

Alright, what happened next?

A:
Well the phone rang again so I answered it. Right after I hung up the phone, I felt a gun
pointed at the back of my head. A man said: “Give me all the money.”
Q:

Can you describe the gun?

A:

I didn’t really see it—like I said, the gun was pointed at the back of my head.

Q:

Then what happened?

A:

I emptied my drawer of all the cash and handed it over to him.

Q:

Could you see what the man was wearing?

A:

He was wearing a baseball hat, and he had on jeans, and a jacket.

LITIGATION STRATEGIES

Q.

How long would you say it took the whole event to occur?

A.

No more than two minutes.

Q.

Then what happened?
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A.
There is a swinging gated door behind the front counter that opens to the lobby, but it’s
always locked. He fumbled with the lock for a moment before running out into the lobby and
out of the hotel. That’s when I got a look at him—when he was trying to leave.
Q.

Did you get a good look at him then?

A.

Yes. He was just a few feet from me, and I got a good view of him. I tried to pay
attention to his face.

Q:

Ms. Potter, do you remember talking to the police at the hotel?

A:
I remember they talked to me, but I’m not sure what I told them. I was so upset I
couldn’t think about it.
Q:

Can you now describe the man who robbed you on March 24th?

A:
Yes. He was a white male in his 20’s with an average build. I didn’t notice anything
unusual or distinctive about him.
Q:

Ms. Potter, that evening did the police contact you again?

A:

Yes.

Q:

What did the police contact you about?

A:
Officer Reilly asked me if I could come in and view a set of photos. I said yes and went
to the station.
Q:

What happened there?

A:
I came to the station and some officers told me to have a seat in this little waiting room in
the back of the station. I was just sitting there by myself when Officer Reilly escorted me to a
room. When I went inside, Officer O’Malley showed me the six photos. After viewing the
photos, I recognized one as the man who robbed me.
Q:

Did you tell Officer O’Malley that?

A:

Yes.
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Tell us about these photos Officer O’Malley showed you.

A:
They brought me into the room and the officer informed me that I would be looking at
some photos. I looked at them for a short while, and then told the officer that the one on the top
right was the same man who robbed me at gunpoint in the hotel.
Q.

Did you learn the name of that man?

A.

Yes, Sam Williams.

Q.

How many photos did you look at?

A.

Six.

Q.

What feature was it that led you to believe it was Mr. Williams?

A.

No particular feature, it was his general appearance.

Q:

Ms. Potter, do you see the man who you robbed you in the courtroom today?

A:
Yes, I do. As a matter of fact, he’s right in front of all of our very eyes! He’s sitting right
there at the defense table (points)!
Mr. Robbins: Let the record reflect that the witness has identified the defendant, Mr. Williams.
Mr. Robbins: No further questions your Honor.
Cross Examination of Heather Potter
Judge: Mr. Dodd, would you like to question the witness?
Mr. Dodd: Yes, thank you, your honor.
Q.
Good afternoon, Ms. Potter. I am Mr. Dodd, the defense attorney in this case. I would
like to ask you some questions regarding the robbery at the hotel in which you work. Are you
currently working at the same Embassy Suites that was robbed?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Ms. Potter, you were an eyewitness to the robbery that occurred at Embassy Suites Hotel,
is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you have any vision problems?
A.
No, I don't.
Q.
And do you wear contacts or glasses?
A.
No, I don't.
Q.
When was the last time you had your eyes checked?
A.
About two months ago. I got something in my eye and they checked it out but my vision
was fine.
Q.
How about your memory, your ability to recall?
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A.
No problems.
Q.
Ms. Potter, how many people would you say used the lobby door of the Embassy Suites
Hotel lobby the evening of March, 24th 2019?
A.
I’m not sure
Q.
More than 10?
A.
Probably
Q.
More than 20?
A.
Possibly.
Q.
And do you clean the door after every person enters or exits?
A.
No, I usually wait until the end of my shift to wipe everything down.
Q.
So, would you say that it’s possible that there were multiple fingerprints on the door
handle at the time of the robbery?
A.
Yes.
Q.
I see. Now, during the robbery after the perpetrator came behind the counter, did he say
anything?,
A.
Yes, he said “give me all the money.”
Q.
What did you do next?
A.
I opened the drawer and gave him all the hundreds, fifties, twenties, and tens.
Q.
Could you see him at this point?
A.
No.
Q.
So you had the best view of him when he was exiting the hotel. How close were you to
him?
A.
About five feet.
Q.
Did you notice any distinguishing features on his face, like birthmarks, scars, or moles?
A.
No.
Q.
What was his facial hair like?
A.
He was clean shaven.
Q.
What was he wearing?
A.
He was wearing a baseball hat, and he had on jeans, and a jacket.
Q.
What color was the jacket?
A.
It was a dark colored jacket.
Q.
Did he verbally threaten you at any point?
A.
No, he just left the hotel.
Q.
Would you say you got a good look at the perpetrator?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What are the color of his eyes?
A.
I don’t know.
Q.
What color was his hair?
A.
I’m not sure, he was wearing a baseball cap.
Q.
What color was the baseball hat?
A.
It was black.
Q.
Did it have anything on it?
A.
There was something embroidered on the front.
Q.
When did you notice something was embroidered on the front?
A.
While he was making his escape.
Q.
What was the embroidery?
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

I don’t remember.
Did the police bring you to the police station to look at photos?
Yes.
And when you looked at those photos, you identified Mr. Williams?
Yes.
And when you identified the photo of Mr. Williams did he look exactly like the person
who robbed you?
A.
Not exactly. In the picture he was not wearing his hat and was wearing different clothes.
Q.
Now, Ms. Potter, you are making a lot of assumptions, aren't you?
A.
In regard to what?
Q.
That he was not wearing his hat. You don't know if Mr. Williams owns a baseball hat.
A.
I know he had one on when he came in to rob me.
Q.
It might be that you are assuming that Mr. Williams robbed you and it wasn't Mr.
Williams?
A.
No, because I recognized him at the lineup.
Q.
Thank you. Your Honor, I have no further questions.
JUDGE: Mr. Robbins you may call your next witness.
Direct Examination of Officer Reilly (Arresting Officer)
Q.
The state calls Officer Reilly to the stand. Officer Reilly, when did you first get involved
in this case?
A:

I was in my car and received a radio call directing me to the Embassy Suites Hotel.

Q:

When was that?

A:

It was 9:05 P.M. on March 24th, 2019.

Q:

What happened when you got there?

A:

There was a woman standing behind the front desk sobbing.

Q:

Did you talk to her about the incident?

A:

Yes, Ms. Potter was pretty shaken up but she told me that there had been a robbery.

Q:

Did Ms. Potter describe the perpetrator?

A:

Only generally. She said he was a young white male in his twenties with an average
build, dressed in jeans, wearing a dark jacket and a baseball hat. She said she didn’t
notice anything unusual about him. She could not tell me his height or weight, but she
was very upset.

Q.

Did she say anything else?

LITIGATION STRATEGIES

44

A.

Nothing except the details of the crime.

Q.

What happened next?

A:

I called the description into headquarters and they sent it out over the police radio.

Q:

What happened next?

A:

I started to drive back to the police station.

Q:

Did anything happen on the way back to the police station?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Could you describe what happened?

A.

Yes, a man waved me down and told me that the word on the street was that the robbery
had been conducted by someone who went by the street name of Sketch.

Q.

What did you do then?

A.

When I got back to the station I searched on Facebook for people in the area who went by
that street name. I found a few profiles that were associated with that street name but
only one of them was owned by someone who matched the description of the robber
given by the witness.

Q.

What was this person’s name?

A.

Samuel Williams.

Q.

What, if anything did you do with this information?

A:

I called Ms. Potter and asked her to come down to the station to view a photo lineup.

Q:

Did she come?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did you conduct the lineup?

A:

No, it is our procedure to have someone uninvolved in the case conduct the lineup. So,
the lineup was conducted by another officer, Officer O’Malley, who had no information
about the case, but I created the lineup.

Q:

Can you tell us how you constructed the lineup?
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A:

I took a photo of Mr. Williams that I found on Facebook. Then I grabbed five other
photos of men from our adult offender database to use as the lineup fillers.

A:

I took a photo of Mr. Williams standing in front of the white background we have in the
booking room. Then I chose photos of men from our adult offender database who
matched the description that the witness, Ms. Porter, gave of the robber to serve as the
lineup fillers. [add the features on which they matched once you have constructed the
array]

Q.

And why did you make sure to match the fillers’ photos to the description that the witness
gave.

A:

Making sure that the fillers matched the description that was given by the witness ensures
that the suspect did not stand out from the fillers because they didn’t match the
description of the culprit and the suspect did. We also make sure that there are no other
factors that would draw attention to the suspect, like making sure all photos were taken
against the same white background.

MR ROBBINS: At this time, I would like to introduce into evidence the photo array that was
used during the lineup procedure.
JUDGE: Any objections? (Pause) Seeing none, Officer Reilly, will you please show the jury the
photo array that you presented to Ms. Potter during her identification procedure?
SHOW THE PHOTOS TO THE JURY.
****SUGGESTIVE CONDITION: Unfair Lineup.
****NOT SUGGESTIVE CONDITION: Fair Lineup.
Q:

What happened after you selected the photos for the lineup?

A:

I gave the photos to officer O’Malley who then conducted the lineup.

Q:

Did Officer O’Malley report to you the result of that lineup?

A:

Yes, the witness identified the suspect, Mr. Williams.

Q:

Then did anything else happen?

A:

My partner and I went to Mr. Williams’s apartment to talk with him.

Q:

Did anything happen when you went to his apartment?

A:

When we pulled up outside his building, we saw a man who looked like the person
depicted in the Facebook profile owned by Mr. Williams. We were about to park when
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the man took off running. I leaped out of the car and took off in pursuit. I was able to
overtake the man and apprehend him. A search of his pockets revealed he was carrying
identification, which indicated that he was Samuel Williams.
Q:

What happened then?

A:

I took Mr. Williams into custody and drove to the police station.

Q:

After you returned to the station, what happened?

A:

I got a fingerprint examiner, Mr. Bapty, to take a sample of his fingerprint so that he
could compare it to fingerprint evidence he had collected from the crime scene.
Cross Examination of Officer Reilly (Arresting Officer)

Judge: Mr. Dodd, any questions?
Mr. Dodd:
Yes, your honor. Officer Reilly, how many Facebook profiles were associated
with the street name, Sketch?
A.

To be honest, I don’t remember.

Q.

Was it more than 1?

A.

Yes.

Q.

More than 100?

A.

No, not that many. Maybe ½ a dozen.

Mr. Dodd:

I have no questions for this witness, your honor.

Q

Officer Reilly, how did you choose the photos that served as fillers in the lineup.

A.

I picked from the database the first five photos of men who were the same race as the
defendant.

Q.

So the pictures of the fillers came from a database of booking photos but the photo of the
Mr. Williams was a photo you found on Facebook?

A.

That’s right.

Q.

Did the photos of the fillers and the photo of Mr. Williams have the same background?

A.

Obviously not.
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Mr. Dodd: I have no more questions for this witness, your Honor.
Direct Examination of Officer Stephen O’Malley (Administrator)
Q.

The state calls Officer Stephen O’Malley to the stand. Officer O’Malley, when did you
first get involved in this case?

A.

When Officer Reilly asked me to conduct the lineup in this case. I met the witness and
took her to the viewing room and instructed her on the lineup procedure.

Q:

Could you describe those instructions?

A.

Yes, I reminded her that the person may or may not be in the lineup, that she is under no
obligation to make any identification, and that the investigation will continue whether or
not she makes an identification. Then I placed the six photos down on the table and
waited for her response.

Q:

What was her response?

A:

Ms. Potter pointed to Mr. Williams’ photo and stated that he was the person who had
robbed the hotel and pointed a gun at her.

Q.

How long would you say it took between the time of the robbery and the identification of
Mr. Williams in the photo lineup?

A:
Q.

Five hours.
Thank you. Your Honor, I have no further questions.

Cross Examination of Officer Stephen O’Malley (Administrator)
JUDGE: Mr. Dodd, you may cross-examine.
Q:
Is it normal procedure to have a lineup the same day as the crime occurred?
A:
It depends on the case, the evidence, and whether we are able to apprehend the
perpetrator.
Q:
Did Ms. Potter say anything about the other photos in the lineup that weren’t of the
defendant?
A:
She first narrowed it down to two photos. Then she made a decision between those two.
Q:
When Ms. Potter made the identification how certain was she?
A:
She looked at the photos for a while before she said anything. At first, she seemed a little
hesitant, but when she spoke up, she appeared pretty sure of her decision.
Q:
Did you get a a statement about how confident she was?
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Yes.
And what was her statement?
That she was pretty certain that the person she had identified was the perpetrator
Have any of your eyewitnesses made mistakes in the past in misidentifying a suspect?
Not to my knowledge.
So, it may have happened, but you are unaware of it?
Yes. I guess that’s possible.
No further questions, your Honor.

Direct Examination of Tom Bapty (Fingerprint Examiner)
JUDGE: Mr. Robbins, you may call witness.
Mr. Robbins, Yes, thank you, your honor.
Q. The state calls Fingerprint Examiner Tom Bapty to the stand. Tom Bapty, when did you first
get involved in the case?
A. When Officer Reilly asked me to take a sample of Mr. Williams’s fingerprint at the police
station.
Q. What did you do next?
A. I drove back to the Embassy Suites Hotel. I collected a set of fingerprint impressions from the
door handle in the lobby where the crime took place. I determined that one fingerprint was
suitable for comparison. I compared this fingerprint to the known fingerprints taken from the
defendant on an inked card. The fingerprint found on the door was individualized as the right
thumb of the defendant.
Q. To better understand your testimony, is it possible to give some basic information about
fingerprints and the fingerprint identification process?
A. Yes I can. Fingerprints are permanent. They are formed before birth, and they remain the
same until after death, barring deep scarring. The underside of our fingers and hands and feet
are covered with raised skin, called friction skin, which is usually covered with a thin film of
perspiration or oil. When the finger or hand touches an item, a reproduction of those ridges is
left by means of that perspiration or oil. That reproduction is called a latent print. Studies
have found that no two people have the same ridge arrangement anywhere on their fingers or
hands. When a fingerprint examiner like myself receives evidence from investigating
officers, the examiner develops the print with powders or chemicals to make it visible, and
then photographs the print. The photograph is then studied using a standard process known as
ACE-V, which stands for Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification. In the ACE-V
process, the examiner first determines whether the print is suitable for comparison, based on
whether there is adequate information in it. If so, then the examiner makes a side-by-side
comparison between the print found at the scene and a known print taken from a suspect. The
examiner then evaluates the degree of similarity between the crime scene print and the
known print.
Q. And just how similar was the crime scene print to the print of Mr. Williams in this case?
A. Like I said, the fingerprint found on the hotel door, though impossible to tell for certain as we
could only obtain a partial marking, had significant similarity to the defendant’s right thumb.
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Q. Thank you. Your honor, I have no further questions.

Cross Examination of Tom Bapty (Fingerprint Examiner)
Judge: Mr. Dodd, would you like to question the witness?
Mr. Dodd: Yes, thank you, your honor.
Q. Mr. Bapty, is it possible that you made a mistake? How certain are you that it was the
defendant’s print that you found at the crime scene?
A. Recent studies have found that fingerprint examiners do sometimes make mistakes about the
source of a fingerprint found at a crime scene. It is a possibility that the defendant was not
the source of the print found at the scene of this robbery.
Q. Even in the case that you didn’t make a mistake about the fingerprint being Mr. Williams’s, is
it possible to know what exact day the fingerprint was from?
A. While some police departments have access to technology that allows them to accurately date
fingerprints if they are less than fifteen days old, our department does not yet have access to
this technology as it has only been recently developed.
Q. So you cannot say that the fingerprint that you claim is from Mr. Williams is even from the
same day as the crime?
A. No, I cannot say for certain.
Q. Could it be the case that the fingerprint that you claim is from Mr. Williams came from a
different time that he entered the hotel? For example, when he frequented the extremely
popular hotel bar, perhaps?
A. Yeah it could be from a previous time that the defendant entered the hotel.
Q. Thank you, I have no further questions.
Prosecution Closing Arguments
JUDGE: Is the prosecution prepared to give its closing remarks?
Mr. Robbins: Yes. Thank you, your honor. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, when I first stood
before you at the beginning of this trial, I told you what we, the state, would prove. I told you
that we had a forensic examiner, Mr. Bapty, obtain fingerprint evidence from the crime scene
and match it to the suspect. You even heard Mr. Bapty testify about obtaining this sample and
the careful methods that he used to do so. I told you that we had an eyewitness who would testify
to what she saw happen that Friday at the Embassy Suites.
Now, you have also heard the defense say that Ms. Potter was mistaken. Ladies and gentlemen,
Ms. Potter is not mistaken. I want you to think to yourself what, if anything, does Ms. Potter gain
from testifying here today? She told you about how she got a long look at the person who
robbed her. [THIS SHOULD BE IN EVERY CONDITION EXCEPT SUPPRESSED/NO INCOURT ID]
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Ms Potter told you about how she identified Mr. Williams from a lineup array as the person who
robbed her.
You even saw Ms. Potter identify him before your very eyes!
I am very confident that when you review the evidence and weight the facts in this case, your
decision will be a very easy one. And that decision is that Mr. Williams is guilty of armed
robbery.
Defense Closing Arguments
JUDGE: And now, the defense may present its closing arguments.
Mr. Dodd: Mistaken identity. Ladies and gentlemen, at the beginning of this trial you heard the
phrase mistaken identity. After listening to the witnesses and looking at the evidence, it is time
for you to make a decision. However, before you decide the outcome of this case, I want to
remind you of your civic duty to the criminal justice system. Let me point out some highlights
of the evidence exposed to you during the trial. I want you to remember how the fingerprint
evidence that Forensic Examiner Bapty was able to obtain from the door handle was not a full
mark, how he himself admitted that forensic examiners make mistakes, and that the fingerprint
could have been from a day prior to March 24th!
I want you to remember that Ms. Potter was initially uncertain when making her identification,
wavering between two members of the lineup. If she had such a good luck at the robber, why
would she be uncertain of her identification of my client unless he were innocent!
I want you also to remember that the state must prove beyond and to the exclusion of any
reasonable doubt that Mr. Williams committed this crime. Ladies and gentlemen, this is an
extremely high burden to meet. I am confident that you will return the only verdict that speaks
the truth, a verdict of not guilty.
Judge’s Closing Instructions
JUDGE: You have had an opportunity to hear all of the witnesses. It is now your duty to find
the facts from all the evidence admitted in this case. To those facts you must apply the law as I
give it to you. The determination of the law is my duty as the presiding judge in this court. It is
your duty to apply the law exactly as I give it go you, whether you agree with it or not. You
must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes, prejudices or sympathy. That means
that you must decide this case solely on the evidence before you and according to the law.
As you know, the defendant has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the
indictment. The indictment is not any evidence at all of guilty. It is just the formal way that the
government tells the defendant what crime he is accused of committing. It does not even raise
any suspicion of guilt.
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Instead, the defendant starts the trial with a clean slate, with no evidence at all against
him, and the law presumes that he innocent. This presumption of innocence stays with him until
the government presents evidence here in court that overcomes the presumption, and convinces
you beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty. It is not necessary for the defendant to disprove
anything. Nor is the defendant required to prove his innocence. It is up to the State to prove the
defendant's guilt by evidence.
The defendant exercised a fundamental right by choosing not to be a witness in this case.
You must not view this as an admission of guilt or be influenced in any way by his decision. No
juror should ever be concerned that the defendant did or did not take the witness stand to give
testimony in the case. You must find the defendant not guilty unless the government convinces
you beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.
The government must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubts. A reasonable doubt is
a doubt based on reason and common sense. It may arise from the evidence, the lack of
evidence, or the nature of the evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt means proof which is
so convincing that you would not hesitate to rely and act on it in making the most important
decisions in your own lives. If you are convinced that the government has proved the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, say so by returning a guilty verdict. If you are not convinced,
say so by returning a not guilty verdict.
The defendant, Samuel Williams, is charged with armed robbery. Before you can find
the defendant guilty of Armed Robbery, the State must prove the following four elements
beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

Samuel Williams took the money or property described in the charge from the
person or custody of the Embassy Suites using a weapon.
2.
Force, violence or assault, or putting in fear was used in the course of the taking.
3.
The property taken was of some value.
4.
The taking was with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the Embassy
Suites of its right to the property or any benefit from it.
"In the course of the taking" means that the act occurred prior to, contemporaneous with,
or subsequent to the taking of the property and that the act and the taking of the property
constitute continuous series of acts or events.
In order for a taking of property to be armed robbery, it is not necessary that the person
robbed be the actual owner of the property. It is sufficient if the victim has the custody of the
property at the time of the offense.
The taking must be by the use of force or violence or by assault so as to overcome the
resistance of the victim, or by putting the victim in fear so that he/she does not resist. The law
does not require that the victim of robbery resist to any particular extent or that he/she offer any
actual physical resistance if the circumstances are such that he/she is placed in fear of death or
great bodily harm if he/she does resist. But unless prevented by fear there must be some
resistance to make the taking one done by force or violence.
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It is also armed robbery if a person, with intent to take property from a victim,
administers any substance to another so that the victim becomes unconscious and then takes the
property from the person or custody of the victim.
In order for a taking by force, violence or putting in fear to be robbery, it is not necessary
that the taking be from the person of the victim. It is sufficient if the property taken is under the
actual control of the victim so that it cannot be taken without the use of force, violence or
intimidation directed against the victim.
You, as jurors, are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of each of the witnesses
called to testify in this case and only you determine the importance or the weight that their
testimony deserves. After making your assessment concerning the credibility of a witness, you
may decide to believe all of that witness’ testimony, only a portion of it, or none of it.
In making your assessment of that witness you should carefully scrutinize all of the
testimony given by that witness, the circumstances under which each witness has testified, and
all of the other evidence which tends to show whether a witness, in your opinion, is worthy of
belief. Consider the witness’s ability to observe you as having an accurate memory or
recollection of these matters. Consider also any relation a witness may bear to either side of the
case, the manner in which each witness might be affected by your verdict, and the extent to
which, if at all, each witness is either supported or contradicted by other evidence in the case.
After making your own judgment or assessment concerning the believability of a witness,
you can then attach such importance or weight to that testimony, if any, that you feel it deserves.
You will then be in a position to decide whether the government has proven the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Appendix C: Post-Trial Survey

1. Case Verdict
a. Guilt (dichotomous: guilty, not guilty)
b. Confidence in guilt decision (100-point scale)
2. Strength of Case
a. Strength of each side’s case (7-point scales: 1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree)
i.
“The prosecution’s case was strong.”
ii.
“The prosecution did not have a lot of evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”
iii.
“The defense’s case was strong.”
iv.
“The defense’s case failed to raise reasonable doubt.”
3. (*When the in-trial ID is present*) Evaluation of the Eyewitness (“How ___ was the
eyewitness that was presented during trial?”; 7-point scales: 1= not at all, 7=extremely)
a. Credible
b. Honest
c. Nervous
d. Confident
e. Suggestible
f. Intelligent
g. Certain
h. Unsure
i. Believable
j. Hesitant
4. Manipulation check Questions
a. “The prosecution presented evidence from a photo lineup that the eyewitness viewed
on the same day as the crime.” (True of False)
b. “The eyewitness pointed to the defendant at the defense table during the course of the
trial (i.e., made an in-court identification).” (True of False)
5. Procedural Suggestiveness (also a manipulation check)
a. “The initial identification procedure was fair.” (7-point scales: 1= strongly disagree,
7= strongly agree)
b. “The initial identification procedure was suggestive.” (7-point scales: 1= strongly
disagree, 7= strongly agree)
c. “The photo array was fair.” (7-point scales: 1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree)
d. The photo array was suggestive. (7-point scales: 1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly
agree)
e. “The fillers caused the suspect to stand out from the other lineup members.” (7-point
scales: 1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree)
f. “The suspect and fillers were photographed in the same way.” (7-point scales: 1=
strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree)
g. Gender
a. Male
b. Female
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h.

i.
j.
k.

l.

m.

c. Another Identity
d. Prefer not to answer
Have You Ever Served on a jury?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Not Sure
Are you a US Citizen
a. Yes
b. No
What year were you born?
Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?
a. No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin
b. Yes, Mexican, Mexican Am., Chicano
c. Yes, Puerto Rican
d. Yes, Cuban
e. Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin
What category or categories best describes you? Choose all that apply.
a. White/Caucasian
b. Black/African American
c. Asian
d. American Indian or Alaska Native
e. Middle Eastern or North African
f. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
g. Some other race, ethnicity, or origin, please specify
How would you describe your political views?
a. Very Liberal
b. Liberal
c. Moderate
d. Conservative
e. Very Conservative
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Appendix D: Debriefing Statement

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology
INTERNET-BASED DEBRIEFING FORM
Title of Research Study: Legal Decision Making
Principal Investigator:

Elaina Welch
Master’s Student
John Jay College of Criminal Justice Department of Psychology
524 West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 Ph: (212) 237-8669
Email: Elaina.Welch@jjay.cuny.edu
Jacqueline Katzman
Ph.D. Student
John Jay College of Criminal Justice Department of Psychology
524 West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 Ph: (212) 237-8669
Email: jkatzman@jjay.cuny.edu

Faculty Advisor:

Margaret Bull Kovera
Professor
John Jay College of Criminal Justice Department of Psychology
524 West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 Ph: (212) 237-8669
Email: mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu

Thank you for your participation in this experiment. The goal of this study was to determine the
effect of in-court identification testimonies on juror’s decision making. In this experiment you
viewed a videotaped simulation of a trial. After which, you answered serval questions about the
case and rendered a verdict. For participation in this study you were compensated $5.00.
Your participation is not only greatly appreciated by the researchers involved, but the data
collected could possibly aid law enforcement in reducing the number of wrongful convictions.
If you have any questions about this study, please contact us:
 Primary investigator/Graduate student: Elaina Welch at elaina.welch@jjay.cuny.edu or
Jacqueline Katzman at jkatzman@jjay.cuny.edu
 Faculty Advisor: Margaret Bull Kovera at mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu or by phone at (505) 3664504.
 IRB: jj-irb@jjay.cuny.edu
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Finally, we urge you not to discuss this study with anyone else who is currently participating or
might participate at a future point in time.
Thank You!

LITIGATION STRATEGIES

57

Appendix E: Consent Form
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Department of Psychology
INTERNET-BASED INFORMED CONSENT
Title of Research Study: Legal Decision Making
Principal Investigator:

Elaina Welch
Master’s Student
John Jay College of Criminal Justice Department of Psychology
524 West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 Ph: (212) 237-8669
Email: Elaina.Welch@jjay.cuny.edu
Jacqueline Katzman
Ph.D. Student
John Jay College of Criminal Justice Department of Psychology
524 West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 Ph: (212) 237-8669
Email: jkatzman@jjay.cuny.edu

Faculty Advisor:

Margaret Bull Kovera
Professor
John Jay College of Criminal Justice Department of Psychology
524 West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 Ph: (212) 237-8669
Email: mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu

We are seeking participants for a study on legal decision making. You are being asked to
participate in this research study because you are 18 years or older. The purpose of this study is
to understand how people make decisions about criminal trials.
-

You will view videos of a plea-bargaining process for a hypothetical case. You will then
answer several questions about the case and the decisions that are made. The study should
take approximately thirty minutes to complete.

-

We do not believe that this research exposes you to risk or discomfort, although you might
experience boredom at times.

-

You will be compensated $5.00 in exchange for your participation. At the end of the
Qualtrics survey, you will receive a completion code that you will need to enter into the
MTurk website so that we can review your completed responses. We will review completed
responses to ensure that you completed the study and provided usable data before

LITIGATION STRATEGIES

58

confirming compensation. We reserve the right to disqualify your data and refuse payment
if you do not provide useable data (i.e., submitted responses in an impossibly short amount
of time, provide nonsensical or irrelevant responses). Only one completed assignment per
IP address will be compensated.
-

We will not collect your name or MTurk ID. We will collect your IP address to ensure that
you are located in the United States and that you only complete the study once. Upon
completion of data collection, we will discard this information. The data file, with IP
addresses removed, will be stored on password protected computers in the investigators’
locked offices. More information about confidentiality can be found at
https://www.qualtrics.com/privacy-statement/.

-

Once the data has been analyzed, we will upload it to the Open Science Framework website
(https://osf.io/dashboard), which offers a data repository to promote open science practices.
Upon completion of the study, we will upload the deidentified data file to the Open Science
Framework website, where it will be available for other researchers to view and to use for
future research without additional informed consent.

Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to participate,
there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled. Your participation or non-participation in this study will in no way affect the benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled. You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop
participating in the research at any time, without any penalty. If you have any questions, you can
contact Jacqueline Katzman at jkatzman@jjay.cuny.edu or Margaret Bull Kovera at
mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu or by phone at (505) 366-4504. If you have any questions about your
rights as a research participant or if you would like to talk to someone other than the researchers,
you can contact CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or
HRPP@cuny.edu.
Do you consent to participate in this study?

 I consent.
 I do not consent.

